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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Case No. 20010443-CA

v.
DAVID ANTHONY RICKS,
Defendant/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his convictions for aggravated assault, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1999), and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §7610-503(1) (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant where the
victim's testimony established all the elements of the charged
crimes, the defendant's presence at the scene was corroborated by
another witness, the defendant's threats to the victim over the
phone were overheard by a police officer, and the defendant
presented no contradictory evidence?
"In considering

an

insufficiency-of-evidence

claim,

[the

Court] reviews the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict."
Honie,

438 Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 2002 UT 4, f44.

reverse

"only

when

the

evidence,

so

viewed,

State

v.

The Court will
is

sufficiently

inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must

have

entertained

a

reasonable

doubt

that

the

committed the crime for which he or she was convicted."
Dunn,

850 P.2d 1201, 1212

(Utah 1993).

defendant
State v.

The Court may not "re-

evaluate the credibility of witnesses or second-guess the jury's
conclusion."
2.

State

v.

Honie,

2002 UT 4, ^44.

Has defendant overcome the presumptive

constitutional

validity of trial counsel's strategy for dealing with evidence of
defendant's
demonstrated

prior

conviction?

that

counsel's

Alternatively,
strategy,

if

has

defendant

constitutionally

deficient, undermines confidence in the outcome?
Because no lower court has ruled on defendant's ineffective
assistance claim, this Court will treat the question as one of law.
State v.

Silva,

2000 UT App 292, 1 12, 13 P.3d 604.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains copies of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103 and
76-10-503 (1) (1999) .
CASE STATEMENT
On

August

16,

2000,

the

State

charged

defendant

with

aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and possession of a
2

dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a second degree felony (R.
2 and 25)- 1
Before trial, the parties stipulated that defendant had been
convicted of a violent

felony and was on parole

(R. 149:4-5).

After a two day trial, a jury convicted defendant on both counts
(R.

119-120, R.

statutory

150:204).

concurrent

prison

The
terms

court
of

sentenced
zero

to

defendant

five years

to
for

aggravated assault and one to fifteen years for possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 126-128).

Defendant

timely appealed (R. 130) .
FACT STATEMENT2
On August 16, 2000, defendant, using a gun, attacked Charene
Martinez in the apartment where she lived with her two- and threeyear-old children.
Six months earlier.

Defendant was a frequent customer at a 7-

Eleven where Ms. Martinez worked, stopping in six or seven times a
day

(R. 149:16-18).

However, Ms. Martinez considered him to be

only a customer, not a friend

(R. 149:15-16).

She never gave

defendant her address, phone number, or pager number (R. 149:17).
Ms. Martinez quit her 7-Eleven ]ob and moved into an apartment six

defendant's use of a firearm and parolee status raised the
crime to a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503(2)(a)
(1999) .
2

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See State v. Wright,
893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah
App. 1995).
3

months before the attack (id.).

she did not see defendant during

that period.
The Party.

On the night of August 15, 2000, Ms. Martinez

had a "get together" for some friends in her new apartment (R.
149:19).

At about 9:00 p.m., Ms. Martinez received a telephone

call from a caller who identified himself as "Josh" (R. 149:1819).

Martinez had a friend named Josh, but the noise from the

party and the radio made it difficult for her to identify the
caller's voice (R. 149:20).

The caller said he was going to come

over and asked for Ms. Martinez's address, which she gave him (R.
149:20).

Josh never showed up that night, and when Ms. Martinez

later spoke to Josh, he denied ever calling the night of August
15th (R. 149:20) .
An Uninvited Visitor.

Ms. Martinez and her friend Wes

Burella began cleaning up from the party in the early hours of
August 16, 2002 (R. 149:19-20).

Her children were in bed and the

partygoers had all left (R. 149:22, 29).
Ms. Martinez heard a knock at her front window, but when she
looked out the window she did not see anybody (R. 149:21).

She

tried to look out the peephole of her door, but someone covered
the peephole from the outside (R. 149:21).

Ms. Martinez assumed

the knock was one of the partygoers returning to retrieve a lost
item, and she did not find the covered peephole unusual because
her friends often made a game of covering the peephole on the

4

door (R. 149:21-22, 52). Ms. Martinez flung the door "wide open"
and saw defendant standing on her doorstep (R. 14 9:53) . Without
saying anything, defendant walked into Ms. Martinez's apartment
and sat down in a chair next to the front door (R. 149:23-24).
When defendant arrived at Ms. Martinez apartment *[h]is face was
kind of happy," but when he entered the apartment and saw Mr.
Burella, his face changed and he appeared "upset about something"
(R. 149:43).
Ms. Martinez did not immediately ask defendant to leave
because she was afraid of him (R. 149:23).

Instead, she sat on

the couch next to Mr. Burella and tried to think of what to do
(R. 149:26-27).

Nobody said anything for a minute, so Ms.

Martinez decided to call the police (R. 149:26-27).
As Ms. Martinez walked towards the phone, it rang (R.
149:27).

When Ms. Martinez answered, her sister's boyfriend,

Chad Studham, and Chad's cousin, Pat, were on the other end (R.
149:27-28, 55-56, 71). Defendant began talking to Mr. Burella,
but looked back and forth between Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez
while Ms. Martinez spoke on the phone (R. 149:28).

As a result,

Ms. Martinez did not feel comfortable telling Pat about
defendant's intrusion, so she tried to communicate that something
was wrong by changing the pitch of her voice (R. 149:28).
Eventually, Ms. Martinez hung up without saying anything about
defendant (R. 149:30) .

5

The Assault.

Ms. Martinez returned to the couch and sat

next to Mr. Burella hoping to give defendant the impression that
Mr. Burella was her boyfriend (R. 149:31).

At this point, Ms.

Martinez overheard defendant telling Mr. Burella that " [she] was
a slut and that [Mr. Burella]'d never get a chance with [her]"
(R. 149:30).

Ms. Martinez told defendant that she was going to

sleep and put her head down (R. 149:31).

Without saying

anything, defendant got up as if to leave (R. 149:31).

He

approached the couch and said, "This is the last time you fuck me
bitch" (R. 149:32).

He then grabbed Mr. Burella's right hand

with his left as if to shake his hand and hit Ms. Martinez in the
face with his right hand (R. 149:31-32).

Ms. Martinez' "head

went back and [her] face started tingling" and "[her] eyes
started watering" (R. 149:32).
Ms. Martinez asked defendant why he "kept following [her]
and why he wouldn't leave [her] alone" (R. 149:33).

She got up

from the couch and walked towards defendant telling him to get
out of her apartment (R. 149:33).

Defendant started walking

backwards calling Ms. Martinez a "bitch," a "cunt," and a "slut"
(R. 149:33).

Defendant backed into the front door, then opened

it (R. 149:34) . Standing in the doorway, defendant lifted his
shirt, drew an automatic pistol from his waistband, and pointed
it at Ms. Martinez (R. 149:35).

Ms. Martinez was walking toward

defendant and her head hit the barrel as she walked into the gun

6

(R. 149:35).
At that point, Mr. Burella, who has a smaller frame than Ms.
Martinez, jumped up from the couch and told defendant to drop the
gun and leave (R. 149:36).

Defendant pulled back the slide on

the pistol to load a round into the chamber and pushed the gun
into Ms. Martinez's temple (R. 149:37).

Defendant began yelling

threats at Ms. Martinez, saying that she should die and that "he
wanted to see [her] insides and outsides or something" (R.
149:38).

Though Ms. Martinez could not remember exactly how long

defendant held the gun to her head, "[i]t seemed like a long
time" (R. 149:28).

Defendant began walking backwards again, and

Ms. Martinez seized the opportunity to push him out the doorway
and to shut and lock the door (R. 149:39).

She then pulled Mr.

Burella to the floor with her and leaned against the door (R.
149:39).

While Ms. Martinez was crouched on the floor, defendant

pounded on the door and window with his gun, yelled, "Open the
door," and again called Ms. Martinez a bitch (R. 149:41, 75-76).
Ms. Martinez again went to the phone.

She was so scared

that she could not remember any phone numbers, so she pressed the
redial button, which rang her sister, Tosha.

(R. 149:40.)

answered and told Ms. Martinez to call 911 (R. 149:40).

Tosha

After

Ms. Martinez hung up with her sister the pounding on the door and
window stopped (R. 149:41).
Ms. Martinez called 911 and explained to the operator what

7

had happened.

Police were dispatched to her apartment.

(R.

149:40, 95.)
Chad Studham overheard the telephone conversation between
Tosha and Ms. Martinez and decided he should check on Ms.
Martinez (R. 149:80, 83). When Mr. Studham arrived at Ms.
Martinez's building, he saw defendant walking out the side of the
building (R. 14 9:83).
149:78).

Mr. Studham knew defendant from prison (R.

Mr. Studham shined a spotlight on defendant and saw

that defendant was wearing shorts and a T-shirt (R. 149:84-85,
91).

Defendant got into a truck and left (R. 149:86, 91).
Mr. Studham proceeded to Ms. Martinez's apartment (R.

14 9:87).

Ms. Martinez opened the door only after Mr. Studham

identified himself (R. 149:87).

Mr. Studham testified that Ms.

Martinez was terrified and crying, and that she had a red mark on
her face (R. 149:87).

Ms. Martinez told Mr. Studham what

happened with defendant and stated that defendant had been
wearing shorts (R. 149:88).

About fifteen minutes later, the

police arrived (R. 149:88).
The Investigation*

Officer Mark Slade received the report

of the assault at approximately 1:32 a.m. and responded to Ms.
Martinez's apartment with at least two other officers (R.
149:95).

Some of the officers questioned Ms. Martinez, Mr.

Studham, and Mr. Burella about the assault, while others left to
search for defendant (R. 149:73-74, 96-97).

8

Because more than

one officer questioned Ms. Martinez, she felt that she was never
able to tell the entire story at one time to an individual
officer

(R. 149:73-74).

Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez described

the assailant as "a male with a shaved head, about 5 feet 10
inches tall, stocky build, a tattoo under his right eye of a
tear, a tattoo on the back of his right lower leg that read '13,'
[and] a goatee that was short" and wearing blue shorts and a Tshirt (R. 149:99).

Mr. Burella and Ms. Martinez separately

provided consistent accounts of the event to Officer Slade
(149:99).
While Officer Slade was at Ms. Martinez's apartment,
defendant called on the telephone (R. 149:100).

(Officer Slade

later confirmed with dispatch that the number that appeared on
Ms. Martinez's caller I.D. belonged to defendant (R. 149:46, 103104).)

Officer Slade listened to the phone conversation between

Ms. Martinez and defendant on another phone (R. 149:101). Ms.
Martinez first asked defendant, "Why did you tell me your name
was Josh?" (R. 149:101).
my name was Dave."

Defendant replied, "I didn't.

(R. 149:101).

I said

Ms. Martinez then asked, "Why

did you hit me?" (R. 149:101) . Officer Slade heard defendant
reply, "Well, because-" then pause and state that he wasn't
stupid (R. 149:45, 102). He then said, "I wasn't at your house.
You're a lying bitch."

(R. 149:45, 102). Ms. Martinez later

asked defendant, "Why did you hit me and pull a gun at me?" (R.

9

149:102).

Defendant replied, "I don't know what you're talking

about." (R. 149:102).

Defendant told Ms. Martinez that she was

stupid, a bitch, and that she deserved to get smacked (R.
149:45).

Officer Slade heard defendant tell Ms. Martinez, "You

deserve to get smacked," or something to that effect (R. 149:
102-103) . Ms. Martinez finally just hung up, but defendant
called back a few minutes later and said "almost the same thing
he said the first time" while Officer Slade listened again (R.
149:46).

Defendant called "a couple" of more times after Officer

Slade left (R. 149:46) .
A warrant was issued for defendant's arrest, and he was
apprehended and charged with aggravated assault and possession of
a dangerous weapon by a restricted person (R. 1-2). The parties
stipulated that the trial court would instruct the jury that
defendant had been convicted of a violent felony and was on
parole for a felony (R. 149:4-5).

When the parties entered the

stipulation, the trial court commented that the instruction would
obviate any need to detail the crime (R. 149:4).
Ms. Martinez, Mr. Studham, and Officer Slade testified for
the state (R. 149:14-115).

(Wes Burrella could not be located

and did not testify (R. 150:142).)

Defendant presented no direct

evidence.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
1.

Sufficiency of the evidence.

10

Defendant has not met his

burden to marshal the evidence supporting the ]ury verdicts.
Specifically, defendant has not presented every "scrap" of
evidence supporting his conviction, then demonstrated how the
supporting evidence was insufficient.

Instead, defendant weaves

supporting and contradictory evidence into a single conglomerate.
When properly marshaled, the evidence is sufficient to support
the jury's verdict.

Ms. Martinez's uncontradicted testimony

alone supports the verdict.
Moreover, defendant's argument is legally inadequate to
support his sufficiency claim.

Defendant relies solely on

alleged disparities between Ms. Martinez's trial testimony,
preliminary hearing testimony, and police statements. At most,
the disparities raise a credibility issue.

That the jury

resolved any credibility issues against defendant does not
demonstrate an insufficiency in the evidence to support its
verdict.
2.

Ineffective assistance of counsel.

Defendant complains

that his trial counsel performed ineffectively because he did not
move to sever the aggravated assault charge from the possession
of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person charge.

Without any

analysis, he concludes that the failure prejudiced him because
the jury deciding the aggravated assault charge learned that
petitioner had a prior conviction.
Defendant has not met his burden on the first element. The

11

record clearly demonstrates that counsel made a strategic
decision about how to handle the prior conviction.

Defendant has

not acknowledged that decision, let alone attempted to rebut the
presumption that it was legitimate.
Defendant also has not demonstrated that any error
undermines confidence in the outcome.

First, defendant has not

demonstrated that a severance motion would have succeeded.
Second, defendant has not demonstrated that the jury knowing he
had a prior conviction for an unspecified felony undermines
confidence in the outcome of his aggravated assault conviction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT THAT DISCRETE INCONSISTENCIES
BETWEEN MS. MARTINEZ'S TRIAL TESTIMONY AND PRIOR
ACCOUNTS ONLY ASKS THIS COURT INVADE THE JURY'S
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO RESOLVE CREDIBILITY ISSUES? IT DOES
NOT DEMONSTRATE THAT THE EVIDENCE, WHEN PROPERLY
MARSHALED, IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S
VERDICT
In order to succeed on his sufficiency challenge, defendant
must first marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict,
then demonstrate that the marshaled evidence is, viewed in the
light most favorable"to the jury's verdict, "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime of which he was convicted."
443, 444 (Utah 1983), superceded

by rule

12

State

v. Petree,

on other

grounds

659 P.2d
by

State v. Walker,

743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987).

See also

Child

v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 (Utah 1998) ("So long as some
evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's findings,
[the court] will not disturb them");L State v. Widdison,

2001 UT

60, f60, 28 P.3d 1278.
Defendant has not met his burden to marshal the evidence.
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at
trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,
the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence."
West Valley

City

v. Majestic

Inv.

Co.,

818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah

App. 1991) . Merely reviewing all the evidence before the fact
finder is insufficient.

Heineck

v. Dep't

of Commerce, 810 P.2d

459, 464 (Utah App. 1991) (finding that defendant failed to
satisfy marshaling obligation where he "reviewed in minute detail
all the evidence" and "left it to the court to sort out what
evidence actually supported the findings").

Rather, "[c]ounsel

must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and
fully assume the adversary's position."

West Valley

City,

818

P.2d at 1315.
Defendant never presents a single unified compilation of all
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict.

13

Defendant's fact

statement merely weaves supporting and contradictory evidence
into a single conglomerate.

Aplt. Br. at 7-8, 10-15, 17-18.

Defendant's argument merely launches directly into an attack on
Ms. Martinez's credibility.

Aplt. Br. 22-25.

Defendant's

failure to meet his marshaling burden independently defeats this
claim.

See, e.g., State v. Hopkins,

1065; Crookston

v.

Fire

Ins.

Exch.,

1999 UT 98, f 16, 989 P.2d
817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah

1991) .
Alternatively, defendant's sufficiency claim fails on the
properly marshaled evidence.

Ms. Martinez testified without

contradiction that defendant: 1) entered her apartment uninvited;
2) made threatening statements, such as "this is the last time
you fuck me, bitch;" 3) slapped her with enough force to make her
head go "back," make her face tingle, and make her eyes water; 4)
produced a gun from his waistband when she tried to get defendant
to leave the apartment; 5) pointed the gun in a way that Ms.
Martinez hit her head on it when she approached defendant; 6)
pulled the slide on the gun to load a bullet into the chamber,
then pushed the gun into Ms. Martinez's temple; and 7) yelled
that Ms. Martinez should die, and that "he wanted to see [her]
msides and outsides or something.

By itself, Ms. Martinez

testimony provided "some evidence" on each element of the charged
crimes.

Child

v. Gonda, 972 P.2d at 433.

14

Therefore, by itself,

her testimony was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.3
Defendant's argument does not establish the contrary.
Defendant argues only that alleged disparities between Ms.
Martinez's pre-trial statements and her trial testimony require
the Court to reverse his convictions.
The argument repeats on appeal the argument his counsel made
below when attacking Ms. Martinez's credibility.

However,

determining the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
evidence are "the exclusive function of the jury."
Booker,

709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).

State

v.

State v. Gorlick,

605

P.2d 761, 762 (Utah 1979) ("The function of this Court *is not to
determine guilt or innocence, the weight to give conflicting
evidence, the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given
defendant's testimony.'") (citation omitted).

"[T]he existence

of contradictory evidence or conflicting inferences does not
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict."

State v. Howell,

64 9

P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).

3

0ther witnesses provided corroborating evidence that
defendant was at Ms. Martinez's apartment and physically
assaulted her. Mr. Studham testified that he saw defendant
walking away from Ms. Martinez apartment. When he entered the
apartment, he saw a red mark on Ms. Martinez's face.
Officer Slade also overheard some of defendant's telephone
conversations with Ms. Martinez. He heard Ms. Martinez ask
defendant why defendant hit her. Officer Slade heard defendant
respond, "Well, because -," pause, and state that he was not
stupid. This testimony corroborated parts of Ms. Martinez
testimony.
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Trial counsel argued the alleged inconsistencies in Ms.
Martinez's testimony to the jury.

The ]ury apparently resolved

any question about her credibility against defendant.

This Court

may not reassess that determination, and defendant's invitation
to do so does not demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient
to support the verdict.
POINT II
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT COUNSEL'S STRATEGY
FOR DEALING WITH DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CONVICTION WAS
CONSTITUTIONALLY DEFICIENT OR THAT IT UNDERMINES
CONFIDENCE IN THE OUTCOME
Defendant contends that counsel's failure to move to sever
the aggravated assault charge from the felon-in-possession charge
deprived him of the competent representation the Sixth Amendment
guarantees.

He further asserts without elaboration that the

failure to sever "clearly" prejudiced his trial on the aggravated
assault.

Defendant has established neither of the

Strickland

elements.4
A.

Standard for reviewing counsel's performance.
In order to establish that he did not receive the

representation guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, defendant must
prove two elements.

First, he must identify the specific acts or

4

This claim affects only defendant's aggravated assault
charge. Defendant has not argued that evidence of the aggravated
assault would have been inadmissible in a separate trial on the
felon-in-possession charge. Consequently, defendant cannot
demonstrate that the failure to sever undermines confidence on
that charge.
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omissions he claims fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness,

Strickland

690 (1984); Parsons
denied,

v. Washington,

v. Barnes,

513 U.S. 966 (1984).

466 U.S. 668, 687-88,

871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah), cert.
In proving that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, defendant must rebut "a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy.'"

Strickland

466 U.S.

at 689. This presumption arises from the requirement that "every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,
to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct,
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the
Id.

time."

The Court must give counsel wide latitude to make

tactical decisions and "will not question strategic decisions
unless there exists 'no reasonable basis' for the decision."
Taylor

v. Warden,

Fernandez

905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995) (quoting

v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 876 (Utah 1993)).

The second element requires defendant to prove that "the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense."
U.S. at 687.

See also,

Parsons,

Strickland, 466

871 P.2d at 522.

"This requires

showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
17

Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687.

"The defendant must show that there

is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.''

Id.

at 694.

The defendant's burden of proof in an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim is further magnified by his duty to assure an
adequate record on appeal.

State v. Litherland,

2000 UT 76,

1 16, 12 P.3d 92. Defendants may not rely on speculation to
support allegations of ineffective assistance but must prove that
the ineffective assistance is a "demonstrable reality,"
871 P.2d at 526 (quoting Fernandez

Parsons,

v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877

(Utah 1991)), and "where the record appears inadequate in any
fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies resulting therefrom simply
will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed
effectively."

State v. Litherland,

2000 UT 76, 1 17.

This Court has held that a trial attorney's failure to move
to sever charges falls below Sixth Amendment standards if the
motion "would likely have been granted had the motion been made."
State v. Hallett,

796 P.2d 701, 706 (Utah App. 1990),

affirmed,

856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993) .5 To the extent Hallett stands for the
proposition that counsel must always pursue a motion, including a
severance motion, that would succeed, it incorrectly states the
5

The Utah Supreme Court's opinion addressed another ruling;
it did not address this articulation of assessing counsel's
performance in the context of severance motions.
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analysis for assessing counsel's performance.

The State

recognizes that it bears a "substantial burden of persuasion" to
justify overturning prior precedent.
393, 398 (Utah 1994), cert, denied,

State

v. Menzies,

889 P.2d

513 U.S. 1115 (1995).

That

burden is met in this case.
First, the Hallett

rule rests on no controlling precedent.

Instead, the Court relied solely on two appellate court decisions
from other states.

State v. Hallett,

More importantly, the Hallett

796 P.2d at 706.
decision contradicts

controlling United States Supreme Court and Utah Supreme Court
precedent.

As the precedents cited above demonstrate, the

deficiency element focuses on the constitutional legitimacy of
counsel's strategic decisions.

The Hallett rule, however,

focuses only on the meritoriousness of a motion that counsel did
not file without considering whether the decision furthered a
legitimate strategy.

The Hallett rule, taken to its logical

conclusion, creates a Sixth Amendment mandate that trial counsel
pursue all motions that are likely to succeed.
However, counsel may have many legitimate reasons for
declining to make certain motions.

For example* counsel may

legitimately conclude not to object to the admission of
inadmissible evidence because he believes, on balance, admitting
the evidence works to his client's benefit.
Bullock,

See, e.g.,

791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert denied,
19

State

v.

497 U.S.

1024 (1990) .
Similarly, counsel may legitimately conclude that succeeding
on a severance motion will not best serve his client's interests.
For example, counsel may have evidence impeaching a State's
witness that would not be admissible m
of two or more joined charges.

separate trials for each

Severing the charges would

inhibit the defense's ability to impeach the witness in separate
trials on some of the charges.

On the other hand, leaving the

charges joined would allow counsel to discredit the witness
generally, improving the chances for acquittal on all of the
charges.
Because the Hallett

rule requires assessing trial counsel's

decisions about what motions to make solely on the basis of
whether they would succeed without considering whether counsel
had a legitimate reason not to file a meritorious motion, it
misstates the correct legal analysis.

Therefore, the Court

should abandon the rule.6
B.

Defendant has not overcome the presumption that trial
counsel performed within constitutional standards.
The record clearly demonstrates that defense counsel made a

strategic decision about how to handle the prior conviction and
parole elements of the possession by a restricted person charge.

6

0f course, the Hallett analysis is relevant to the second
Strickland
element. If the motion would not likely have
succeeded, then failing to bring it cannot undermine confidence
in the outcome.
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The defense agreed to instruct the jury that defendant had a
prior conviction for a violent felony and was on parole for any
felony.

As the trial court noted, the stipulation obviated the

need to detail the prior felony to the jury (R. 149:4).
Under either the specific Hallett
Strickland

analysis or the general

analysis and on this record, defendant cannot

establish constitutionally deficient performance.

The Hallett

rule obligates defendant to demonstrate that a motion to sever
the counts likely would have succeeded.

Defendant argues without

analysis that the prior conviction had no relevance and would
have been excluded in a separate trial on the aggravated assault
charge.

Aplt Br. at 27-28.

The record is insufficient to support the argument.
record does not specify what the prior felony was.
been admissible for impeachment.

See,

The

It may have

e.g., State v. Betha,

951

P.2d 611, 616-17 (Utah App. 1998) (prior felony admissible under
Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1) to impeach defendant).7 Moreover,
without knowing any details of the prior felony, the Court cannot
assess the validity of defendant's unsupported conclusion that it

7

Admittedly, defendant did not testify. However, the record
demonstrates that the defense had not determined whether
defendant would testify at the time counsel stipulated to the
instruction on defendant's prior conviction. In his opening
statement, counsel asked the jury to reserve judgment until it
heard both sides of the story (R. 149:11). In his closing
argument, defense counsel apologized for not providing both sides
of the story (R. 149: 189).
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would not have been admissible under Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
Indeed, defendant's prior commitment to prison was admitted as
foundation for Mr. Studham's ability to identify him (R. 149: 7879).

Thus, it was admitted for a legitimate, non-character
See, e.g.,

purpose as permitted by Utah R. Evid. 404(b).
v. DeCorso,

1999 UT 57, % 25, 993 P.2d 837.

State

On this record,

defendant has not demonstrated and cannot demonstrate deficient
performance even under the Hallett
Litherland,

analysis.

See

State

v.

2000 UT 76, 1 17 (on direct appellate review of trial

counsel's performance, the Court resolves record ambiguities in
favor of finding a legitimate strategic decision).8
Defendant certainly has not demonstrated deficient
performance under the Strickland

analysis that affords counsel

great deference in making strategic decisions.

Counsel filed no

Utah R. App. P. 23B motion to remand the case to develop the
record concerning this counsel's strategy decision..9

However,

the record is clear that counsel did not merely ignore the issue
of defendant's prior conviction; instead, he made a strategic

3

In his closing argument, defense counsel relied on Mr.
Studham's prior inmate status to challenge his credibility.
9

In a footnote, defendant asserts that he filed a 23B
motion, which the Court denied. Aplt. Br. at 27 n.l. However,
the State received no such motion and none appears on the Court
docket. Moreover, the footnote asserts that an appellant named
Coonce filed the 23B motion. It appears that defendant has
mistakenly included an inapplicable footnote from a brief in an
unrelated appeal.
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choice about how to deal with it.

That choice prevented the jury

from hearing the details of defendant's prior violent felony:
details that may well have prejudiced defendant far worse than
the mere fact of a prior conviction.

Defendant has not

acknowledged that counsel made a strategic decision, let alone
attempted to rebut the presumption that it was legitimate.
Moreover, as argued, evidence that defendant had a prior
conviction was already admitted and may have been admissible for
other purposes.

Counsel may well have concluded that the

conviction would have been admitted, and that he could best serve
his client by agreeing to the fact of the prior conviction to
avoid revealing its details.
C.

Defendant has not demonstrated that admitting the evidence
undermines confidence in the outcome of the aggravated
assault charge.
In order to succeed on his ineffective assistance claim,

defendant must also demonstrate that counsel's failure to move to
sever the counts undermines confidence in the outcome.

The sum

of defendant's prejudice argument is that, because the Utah
Supreme Court found in State v. Saunders,

699 P.2d 738 (Utah

1985), that the denial of Saunders' severance motion was
prejudicial, reversible error, counsel's decision in this case
not to seek severance necessarily undermines confidence in the
outcome.
The argument falls far short of the mark of demonstrating

23

prejudice to a "demonstrable reality."

First, as explained,

defendant has not argued, let alone established that the trial
court would or even should have severed the two charges.

For the

reasons argued previously, it is impossible to make that
determination on this record.

Defendant's failure to establish

that the motion would have succeeded independently defeats his
claim.
Second, defendant also presents no analysis demonstrating
that defendant had a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result on the aggravated assault charge if it had been tried
separately from the felon in possession charge.

On this record,

defendant cannot meet that standard.
The jury knew defendant had a prior conviction because the
State offered evidence that Mr. Studham knew defendant in prison
when he explained how he could recognize defendant as the person
he saw leaving the scene. As argued above, the evidence may also
have been admissible for other purposes; however, the record is
inadequate to assess its admissibility fully.
Moreover, unlike Saunders where an accomplice's immunized
testimony comprised the primary guilt evidence, the State here
relied chiefly on the victim's testimony.

The record contained

no evidence of a motive for Ms. Martinez to inculpate defendant
falsely.
In addition, independent witness evidence supported at least

24

some of Ms. Martinez story.

Officer Slade overheard defendant

make a statement that amounted to an admission that defendant had
at least hit Ms. Martinez.

He also overheard defendant tell Ms.

Martinez that she deserved "to get smacked."

Mr. Studham saw

defendant near the apartment and observed a red mark on Ms.
Martinez's face where she reported defendant slapped her.
On the other hand, defendant adduced no evidence directly
rebutting any of the State's evidence.

Defendant did not even

deny being at Ms. Martinez's apartment.
Finally, the jury learned of the prior conviction only
through foundation to Mr. Studham's testimony and an instruction
that the parties had stipulated to the felon-in-possession
element of a prior conviction for a violent felony and that
defendant was on parole for a felony.
about the felony's details.

The jurors never learned

Defendant has not attempted to

demonstrate how reference to a prison sentence and an instruction
that the parties had stipulated to an element undermines
confidence in the outcome.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm
defendant's convictions.
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ADDENDUM A

76-5-103. Aggravated assault.
( D A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony.
(3) A violation of Subsection (1Kb) is a third degree felony.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-103, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-103; 1974, ch. 32, 9 10;
1989, ch. 170, 5 2; 1996, ch. 291, i 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, added 'under
circumstances not amounting to a violation of
Subsection (lXa)" to the beginning of Subsec-

tion (1Kb); substituted "A violation of Subsection UXaf for "Aggravated assault" and "second degree" for "third degree" in Subsection (2);
and added Subsection (3).
Cross-References. — Attempt, § 76-4-101.
Possession of a dangerous weapon with intent to assault, § 76-10-507.

76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon,
firearm, or explosive — Persons not permitted to
have — Penalties.
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government,
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined m
Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony.
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have
in his possession or under his custody or control any explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device as those terms are defined in Section 76-10-306 or
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-10-501.
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is afirearmor an explosive, chemical,
or incendiary device he is guilty of a second degree felony.
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun
described in this part who:
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the
United States, this state, or any other state;
(ii) is under indictment;
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in
Section 58-37-2;
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2;
(v) has been adjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution;
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States;
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions; or
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States,
has renounced such citizenship.
(b) Any person who violates this Subsection (3) is guilty of a third
degree felony.
tfifltory? C. 1953.76-10-603, enacted by L. inserted "explosive, chemical, or incendiary de196, « 76-10*503; 1*77, ch. 82, 5 1; vice as those terms are defined in Section
tf& ch. 210, 5 1; 1990, ch. 160, § 1; 1991, 76-10-306* in Subsection (2Xa), inserted
h i 7,4 li 1991, ch. 87,5 5; 1993, ch. 62, § 2; "chemical" in Subsection (2Kb), and made a
i £ k c h . l M 2; 1994,ch. 149,5 2;1997,ch. minor stylistic change.
JJl 12; 1999, ch. 97, §8.
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun VioAmendment Notes. — The 1997 amend- lence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection
ed, effective May 5, 1997, substituted "Sec- (3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U S.C. § 921
tion 76-10-501" for "this part* in Subsections et seq.
(IXa) and (2Xa) and made a stylistic change in
Cross-References, — Alien's right to huntSubsection (3Xb).
ing licenses and certificates, § 23-19-4.
The 1999 amendment, effective May 3,1999,
f JJlch.

